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NOTES
Spotlight on the Jury: Trial Publicity

and Juror Privacy
By SUSAN L.

GREENBERG*

I
Introduction
The reporter was the first media representative allowed to
enter the courtroom. With pen and pad in hand, writers and
reporters from newspapers, magazines, books1 and eventually
radio covered the events of the courtroom. Artists' sketches of
the court proceedings often accompanied many of the written
articles.
With the advent of the camera, courts had a new media representative to contend with-the still photographer. The press
added some "real-life drama" to news stories by including with
its written articles actual photographs of the courtroom proceedings. 2 Next, television arrived on the scene, and reporters
attempted to introduce electronic media equipment-the television camera and microphone-into the courtroom. A major
struggle between the media and the courts had begun.
The first ban on cameras in the courtroom occurred after
both newsreporters and photographers created a "circus" atmosphere at the trial of State v. Hauptmann,3 in which Bruno
Hauptmann was convicted of the kidnapping and murder of
Charles Lindbergh's infant son. Within thirty years the Ameri* Member, Third Year Class. B.A., Claremont McKenna College, 1981. The author wishes to thank James Wagstaffe of Cooper, White and Cooper, San Francisco, for
his valuable assistance in the preparation of this note. This note is dedicated to Patrick E. Brown.
1. See, e.g., THE TRIAL OF BRUNO RICHARD HAUPTMANN (S. Whipple ed. 1937); G.
WALLER, KIDNAP: THE STORY OF THE LINDBERGH CASE

(1961).

2. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (publicity of court proceedings included photographs of the trial along with the written articles).
3. State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935).
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can Bar Association,4 the federal judiciary,' and nearly every
state had banned cameras from judicial courtroom proceedings.6 After the introduction of television, televised coverage of
trials was also prohibited.7
The conflict over whether to allow cameras in court continues. Although the American Bar Association and federal
courts continue to oppose the idea,8 almost half of the states
are now experimenting with permitting camera coverage of
courtroom proceedings.9 This new attitude favoring experimentation, influenced by the Supreme Court decision in Chandler v. Florida,10 has developed into an increasingly stronger
trend over the past few years."
4. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 35 (1937). This Canon stated, in part:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.
The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or
recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the
court and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public
and should not be permitted.
5. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 'The taking of
photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio
broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court room shall not be permitted by the
court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 (enacted in 1946).
6. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 580-81 & n.39 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
7. The ABA amended Canon 35 in 1952 to proscribe the televising of courtroom
proceedings. 77 A.B.A. REP. 429, 610-11 (1952).
8. See 77 A.B.A. REP. 429, 610-11 (1952), for the ABA amendment to Canon 35 and
see JUD. CONF. ANN. REP. 9-10 (1962), for a similar amendment by the federal judiciary.
9. See Comment, In the Wake of Chandlerv. Florida:A Comprehensive Approach
to the Implementationof Cameras in the Courtroom, 33 FED. COM. L.J. 117 (1981), for a
comprehensive survey of state experiments with cameras in the court.
10. 449 U.S. 560 (1981). See infra note 11.
11. Id. In the past twenty years the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken twice on the topic of cameras in the courtroom. Each time, the Court concentrated
its analysis on whether television cameras and microphones violated the defendant's
right to a fair trial. In neither case did the Court make a detailed analysis of whether
television media violated the privacy rights of any of the trial participants.
In the first of these cases, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Court held that the
defendant's fourteenth amendment due process rights had been violated by the televising of his pretrial and trial proceedings. Id. at 535. One basis for this decision was
the disturbing fact that during the pretrial hearing, at least twelve still and television
cameramen were in the courtroom, along with numerous cables and microphones that
were placed near the judge, counsel, jury and witness stand. Id. at 536. During the
trial, the judge limited the number of microphones and cameras to a bare minimum,
and then restricted the placement of that equipment and the amount and timing of the
telecasting of the trial. Id. at 536-38.
It was not until Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), was decided that states began to lift their bans on cameras in court. The Chandler Court held that the Constitution does not prevent states from permitting the televising of judicial proceedings. Id.
at 582-83. In so holding, the Court noted that its prior decision in Estes could not be
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The controversy surrounding camera coverage has polarized
the news media and the courts. This issue is merely one aspect of the conflict between the media and the courts regarding
access to trial proceedings. The basic rights of the
photojournalist are the same as those of the reporter for both
print and electronic media; the media contends it has a first
amendment 2 right of access to court proceedings which is
equal to that of the public. 3 Many courts, on the other hand,
weigh more strongly the possible adverse effects of televising
courtroom proceedings, especially its impact on a criminal defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial 4 and to due pro5
cess of law.'
Because the fair trial rights of defendants are emphasized
and expressly protected by the Constitution, the rights of other
trial participants are often overlooked. All other trial participants-plaintiffs, witnesses, jurors, attorneys and even
judges-have rights which are either guaranteed by the Constitution or derived from the common law.'6 Although these trial
participants may also have rights which oppose the media's
first amendment right of access to court proceedings, most
courts have completely neglected or barely discussed such issues when considering media coverage of trials. 7
In particular, the privacy rights of jurors have consistently
been overlooked. Until recently, the media focused little, if
read as a constitutional, per se ban on courtroom coverage by photograph, radio or
television. Id. at 573. The Chandler decision has been read by most to mean that
states may experiment with allowing cameras in the courtroom. See generally
Hughes, Chandlerv. Florida: Cameras Get Probationin Courtrooms, 26 J. BROADCAST
431 (1982); Nesson and Koblenz, The Image of Justice: Chandlerv. Florida, 16 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 405 (1981); Winter, Camerasin the Courtroom: What Next After Chandler? 67 A.B.A. J. 227 (1981); Ares, Chandlerv. Florida: Television, Criminal Trials,and
Due Process, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 157. Thus, many states are permitting a restricted
number of cameras in the courtroom on a trial basis in an effort to determine how, if at
all, they will affect that state's judicial system.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See infra text accompanying note 57.
13. See generally Chandler, 449 U.S. 560; Estes, 381 U.S. 532.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See infra text accompanying note 38.
15. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. See infra text accompanying note 44.
16. For example, witnesses have a privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed
by the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
and Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). Attorneys are protected by common
law from intentionally defamatory remarks. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974).
17. See, e.g., Chandler, 449 U.S. 560; Estes, 381 U.S. 532. See generally Comment,
The "Right of Information Triangle": A FirstAmendment Basisfor Televising Judicial
Proceedings, 4 U. HAwAii L. REV. 85 (1982).
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any, attention on the jury; increasingly, however, the jury is being placed in the spotlight. 1 8 Questions remain regarding the
scope of a juror's right of privacy and whether this right can be
violated in certain circumstances by the media. Although the
existence of a juror's privacy right has been acknowledged, 9
no court has endeavored to explore fully the nature and scope
of this right.
This note examines the issues concerning the privacy rights
of jurors by examining the current state of the law concerning
trial publicity.2" It enumerates the constitutional bases for the
media's access rights to courtroom proceedings and for a defendant's rights at trial, and considers the existence and nature
of a juror's right of privacy. In analyzing and balancing the potentially competing rights between jurors and the media, this
note proposes that jurors do have privacy rights which should
be protected.

II

Court Decisions Discussing Juror Privacy
Judges have not completely ignored the group of individuals
who sit beside them in the jury box. However, acknowledgment and protection are two very different matters; courts
have mentioned and discussed juror privacy but have, as yet,
failed to recognize and define the scope and nature of any legally enforceable right. For example, in Sheppard v. Maxwell,2 ' the Supreme Court discussed the plight of jurors
involved in that sensational trial:
Numerous pictures of the jurors, with their addresses, which
appeared in the newspapers before and during the trial itself
exposed them to expressions of opinion from both cranks and
friends. The fact that anonymous letters had been received by
prospective jurors should have made the judge aware that this
publicity seriously threatened the jurors'privacy.22
18. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353 (1965), the Supreme Court noted that

"the jurors were thrust into the role of celebrities by the judge's failure to insulate
them from reporters and photographers."
19. Id. at 353, 355. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
20. For the purposes of this note, trial publicity refers generally to all tools and
forms of the media used to disseminate information about courtroom proceedings.
This includes written news articles, spoken radio reports, artists' sketches, still photographs, and television news coverage via cameras and microphones.
21. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
22. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
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The Court further concluded that the "total lack of consideration for the privacy of the jury was demonstrated by the assignment to a broadcasting station of space next to the jury
room on the floor above the courtroom ... 23
Likewise, in United States v. Barnes,24 a federal appellate
court acknowledged jurors' privacy rights when it noted that
the law did not require jurors to publicly disclose their identities and publicly take responsibility for the decisions they
make. 25 The court reasoned that if an anonymous juror feels
is as it
less pressure regarding the decision to be made, "this
26
impartiality.
his
to
should be-a factor contributing
Recently, the Supreme Court decided Press-EnterpriseCo. v.
Superior Court,2 7 in which it addressed the issue of whether
the guarantees of open public proceedings in criminal trials
cover proceedings for the voir dire examination of potential jurors. 28 In holding that such guarantees do extend to voir dire,
the Court added that the "privacy interests of. . .a prospective juror must be balanced against the' historic values ... and
the need for openness of the process. "29
More specifically, the Press-Enterprise Court noted that
there is a historical presumption that jury selection has been a
public process with exceptions recognized only when good
cause is shown.3 ° In addition, the Court stated that openness
enhances the fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance
of fairness essential to public confidence in the system of criminal justice.3 1 The Court found that this presumption of openness had not been rebutted in the case in question where only
three days of a six week voir dire were open to the public and
consider alternatives to complete clowhere the judge did not
32
sure of the courtroom.
Although the Court declined to define juror privacy rights in
23. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
24. 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
25. Id. at 140.
26. Id. at 141.
27. 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984).
28. Voir dire is perhaps the period when a juror's privacy rights are most directly
threatened because it focuses on the identities and personal characteristics of the juror. For a detailed analysis of privacy rights during voir dire see Comment, The Right
to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During Voir Dire, 70 CAL. L. REv. 708 (1982).
29. 104 S. Ct. at 825.
30. Id. at 822.
31. Id. at 823.
32. Id. at 824-26.
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Press-Enterprise,it repeatedly acknowledged their legitimate
existence. 3 The Court suggested that jurors seeking protection
of their privacy in an open voir dire proceeding should be required to "present their problem to the judge in camera but
with counsel present and on the record." 4 The Court added:
By requiring the prospective juror to make an affirmative request, the trial judge can ensure that there is in fact a valid
basis for a belief that disclosure infringes a significant interest
in privacy. This process will minimize the risk of unnecessary
closure. The exercise of sound discretion by the court may
lead to excusing such a person from jury service. When limited
closure is ordered, the constitutional values sought to be protected by holding open proceedings may be satisfied later by
making a transcript of the closed proceedings available within
a reasonable time, if the judge determines that disclosure can
be accomplished while safeguarding the jurors' valid privacy
interests. Even then a valid privacy right may rise to a level
that part of the transcript should be sealed, or the name of a
juror withheld,
to protect then [sic] person from
35
embarrassment.
It is interesting to note that the Press-Enterprise Court acknowledged the possibility that potential infringement of valid
juror privacy interests could prompt limited closure of a criminal court proceeding. In addition, the Court stated that a juror's valid privacy right may justify the withholding of his or
her name from the public, and may be so strong a right that
part of the transcript of the court proceedings should be sealed
to protect the juror. The Court criticized the trial judge in the
instant case for not considering alternatives to complete closure of the voir dire proceedings, stating that the judge did not
"consider whether he could disclose the substance of the sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of the jurors involved. '36 Thus, the Court appears to have acknowledged
unequivocally that a trial court may preserve the anonymity of
jurors in a criminal proceeding in order to protect their privacy
rights.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 825-26.
Id. at 826 (emphasis added).

No. 21

SPOTLIGHT ON THE JURY

III
Rights of the Media
Before attempting to reconcile the competing rights of jurors
and the media, it is necessary to isolate the possible sources of
these rights. Determination of the nature and scope of the media's right to attend court proceedings involves consideration
of the rights of the general public to attend court proceedings.
One source of the public's right is the defendant's due process
right and right to a fair trial; in this context, the defendant's
rights will first be examined. In addition, the Supreme Court
has recognized a right of access for the press and public based
on the first amendment; this source will also be considered.
A. The Defendant's Rights
Throughout the controversy over camera coverage of courtroom proceedings, the major concern of courts and the legal
profession regarding the rights of trial participants had been
whether trial publicity violated the defendant's rights to a fair
trial and to due process of law. 7 The sixth amendment provides that "[i] n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
.... I'l The amendment's provision for trial by an impartial
jury has been generally interpreted to ensure that defendants
have a fair trial,39 and the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the constitutional guarantee of a public trial as protecting the fairness of judicial proceedings.4" Nearly four
decades ago, the Court wrote that the public trial guarantee to
the defendant is a "safeguard against any attempt to employ
our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in
the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible
abuse of judicial power."'" In Estes v. Texas,42 the Court again
37. See Chandler, 449 U.S. 560; Estes, 381 U.S. 532. See generally Hughes, Chandler
v. Florida: CamerasGet Probationin Courtrooms,26 J. BROADCAST 431 (1982); Nesson
and Koblenz, The Image of Justice: Chandler v. Florida, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 405
(1981); Pequignot, From Estes to Chandler. Shifting the Constitutional Burden of
Courtroom Cameras to the States, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 315 (1981); Winter, Cameras in
the Courtroom: What Next After Chandler? 67 A.B.A. J. 227 (1981).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979).
40. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 276 (1948); Estes, 381 U.S. at 538-39.
41. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
42. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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the purpose of a public trial is to ensure
espoused the view that
43
that justice is served.
In addition to the sixth amendment protection, the fifth and
fourteenth amendments provide defendants with due process
rights, guaranteeing that "[no] person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ."I
The Supreme Court relied on this protection in Estes when it
held that the defendant's due process rights had been violated
by the televising of his pretrial and trial proceedings.4 5
B.

The Public's Rights

The sixth amendment provision granting the accused the
right to a public trial has been interpreted to mean that criminal trials are open proceedings which the public may attend. 46
However, the wording of this amendment clearly indicates that
this is a right belonging to the defendant, not the public. The
47
Supreme Court so determined in Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale
when it held that members of the public have no constitutional
right under the sixth and fourteenth4 8 amendments to attend

criminal trials.41
43. Id. at 538-39, where the Court stated that the constitutional guarantee is to ensure the accused is "fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned."
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[no] State
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
45. 381 U.S. at 535 (the Court applied the rule against televising taped confessions
in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), to the hearing in Estes). The Court apparently discounted or completely disregarded defendants' due process rights in Chandler when it said that the states could experiment with camera coverage of trials. See
supra note 11.
46. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-69 (1980). See also
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). One should keep in mind, as the Supreme
Court has noted, that the concept of a public trial does not mean that each and every
community member should be able to see or hear the proceedings; a public trial is
merely one that is open, not closed, and one which non-officials can attend. Douglas,
The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A. J. 840, 842 (1960). See In re Oliver, 333
U.S. at 271-72 (1948).
47. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
48. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends, among other
Bill of Rights provisions, the sixth amendment protections to the states. See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
49. 443 U.S. at 380-81. In Gannett, the Supreme Court held that a criminal pretrial
hearing could be closed to both the public and the news media. The Court reasoned
that such closure was proper where the accused, the prosecutor and the trial judge
have all agreed to closure of the proceeding in order to protect the defendant's constitutional fair trial rights. Id. at 370-94. It is unclear whether the Gannett Court decided
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One year later, however, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,50 the Court distinguished Gannett and stated that
criminal trials must be open to the public. 1 It determined that
a public right to attend criminal trials is "implicit in the guarantee of the first amendment."5 2 The Supreme Court affirmed
this right in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 3 when it
stated that its decision in Richmond Newspapers "firmly established for the first time that the press and general public have a
constitutional right of access to criminal trials." 4
Nevertheless, the Court in both decisions did not find this
right to be unqualified. In Richmond Newspapers, the Court
noted that, absent "overriding interests," to be determined on
a case-by-case basis, criminal trials must be open to the public. 55 Additionally, the Globe Court clearly qualified its finding
by stating that "[a]lthough the right of access to criminal trials
is of constitutional stature, it is not absolute."5 6
C.

The Media's Rights

The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law ...
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
...
In Richmond Newspapers and Globe, the Court acknowledged rights of access for the press and the public based
on this constitutional amendment.5 8 A question remains, however, as to what constitutes "access." The press asserts that
since the first amendment grants it the freedom to disseminate
information, it must also grant it the rights to receive and
if trials as well as pretrial proceedings could be closed upon the agreement of the trial
participants. See Comment, supra note 17, at 98 n.75.
50. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
51. Id. at 581. In Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that trials constitute a source of information "particularly amenable to a constitutional right
of attendance": they are under governmental rather than private control, id. at 575-79;
they have historically been open to the public, id. at 564-69; their free accessibility
helps promote the fair and proper administration of justice, which is the single overriding purpose of judicial proceedings, id. at 569-72; and they represent a vital part of
government which is or at least should be of special concern to the general citizenry,
id. at 575. Comment, supra note 17, at 97-98.
52. Id. "Although there was no opinion of the court in that case, seven justices
recognized that this right of access is embodied in the first amendment." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 596.
54. Id. at 597.
55. 448 U.S. at 581-82 & n.18.
56. 457 U.S. at 598.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580; Globe, 457 U.S. at 603.
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gather information.59 Although it seems clear that the first
amendment guarantees the press' rights to receive and disseminate information, 60 it is not so certain whether an unrestrained right to gather information is similarly protected.61
The media contends that this first amendment right, along
with sixth amendment protections, grant it a constitutional
right to attend criminal proceedings and more specifically, to
gather and report information about trials. It claims this right
is equal to that of the general public. 62 In other words, the media argues that because the public has a constitutional right to
attend criminal proceedings and because the press has a constitutional right freely to receive, gather and report to the general public information about these proceedings, it follows that
the press has a constitutional right, equal to that of the public,
to attend such trials. Both Richmond Newspapers and Globe,
as noted above, support this view but add that such a right is
not absolute. 3 Additionally, the Court in Estes v. Texas suggested that another purpose for the sixth amendment public
trial provision is that it promoted the first amendment rights of
the press. 64 However, the Estes Court concluded that the free59. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (Supreme Court expressly recognized the right to gather information as having constitutional dimensions). See Comment, supra note 17, for a detailed analysis of these concepts.
60. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). The general right to disseminate information has been long recognized by the Supreme Court as protected by the free speech
and press guarantees of the first amendment. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. 555 (closure of criminal trials); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(prior restraint); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (statute
requiring newspapers to print the reply of a political candidate); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel action); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
(ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature within the city limits).
61. In Zemel, the Supreme Court stated that the "right to speak and publish does
not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." 391 U.S. at 17. Cf. Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 472 (1975) (upholding the publication of a
rape victim's name gathered from public records). See also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684
(remarking that "the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional
right of special access to information not available to the public generally"); Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Justice Stevens noting, "The preservation of a full
and free flow of information to the general public has long been recognized as a core
objective of the First Amendment to the Constitution." (Stevens, J., dissenting)). But
cf. Globe, 457 U.S. 596 (striking down a Massachusetts statute which was interpreted
by the state's highest court to require trial judges, at sex-offense trials involving a minor victim, to exclude the press and general public from the courtroom under all circumstances during the testimony of that victim).
62. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73, 578.
63. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
64. 381 U.S. at 539-40.
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dom granted the press under the first amendment itself must
be subject to maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial
65
process.
In summary, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the
media has a right of access to criminal courtroom proceedings
based on the first amendment. However, neither the first nor
the sixth amendments grant the media an unrestricted license
to attend and cover any and all criminal courtroom
proceedings.

IV
Privacy Rights of Jurors
The defendant's right to a fair trial is clearly founded in the
Constitution.6 6 The Supreme Court has also recognized constitutional rights of the public and the media to attend trials,
based on the first amendment.6 7 However, the question remains as to the possible nature and sources of a juror's rights
in a court proceeding.
A.

Constitutional Basis

The Supreme Court for the first time recognized the existence of a constitutional right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.6 Initially, the constitutional protections strictly dealt
with the right to be free from substantive governmental regulation in certain areas of one's personal life.69 However, in
Whalen v. Roe,7" the Court acknowledged that the constitutional right of privacy protected "the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters."7 1 Specifically, the
Court in Whalen held that certain names and addresses of
medical patients could be disclosed to authorized personnel in
the New York Health Department, but it limited disclosure to
those particular personnel and specifically excluded the gen65. Id.
66. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The constitutional right of privacy is distinguishable from
the tort-protected right. See infra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
69. Id. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (right to distribute religious literature); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (right to prohibit sterilization).
70. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
71. Id. at 599.
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eral public.72 The Court determined that limited disclosure
would not pose a "sufficiently grievous threat" to the constitutionally protected privacy interests of the patients.73 Some
commentators argue that, by implication, the Whalen Court
has expanded the constitutional right of privacy to include
freedom from public disclosure of a private fact, formerly pro74
tected only by the tort of invasion of privacy.

If applicable to trial participants, this constitutional right of
privacy could protect a juror from disclosure of "personal matters." While the Court in Whalen failed to define what constitutes "personal matters," such information should, at the very
least, include a juror's name, address or other biographical information. Arguably, any constitutional right of privacy should
also protect against publication of a juror's likeness in a photograph or artist's sketch.
B.

Tort Basis

A cause of action for tortious invasion of privacy initially developed at common law. 75 This "right of privacy" which protects one's "right
to be left alone,' 76 is codified today in many
77
state statutes.

There are four distinct privacy rights78 generally recognized
as protected from tortious invasion: (1) appropriation of name
or likeness; 79 (2) intrusion upon seclusion;8" (3) public disclo72. Id. at 600-02.
73. Id. at 600.
74. See Comment, supra note 17, at 119.
75. See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890) and Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 329 (1979).
76. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 75, at 195; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 117, at 802 (4th ed. 1971).
77. See. e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 376-77 n.1, in which the Supreme Court
applied New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney
1976) provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 51 provides a cause of action for injunction and for damages for a violation of a
person's right of privacy in a manner similar to that provided in § 50.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1976).
79. Id. at § 652C. See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938);
Steding v. Battistoni, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 76, 208 A.2d 559 (1964). See generally Gordon,
Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 553
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sure of a private fact;8 ' and (4) placing the plaintiff in a false
82
light.
Of the four types of tort-protected privacy interests, public
disclosure of a private fact is most applicable to a trial participant. This offense applies to one who gives "publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another" which is "highly
offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public."8 3 The identity of a trial participant is arguably a matter which "concerns his or her private life."
Publicizing a trial participant's identity, whether by word or
photograph, could reasonably be deemed highly offensive to
that participant, just as personal information, publicly revealed, could cause embarrassment.
In addition, it could be argued that the identity of a trial participant may not be of legitimate concern to the public. While
the factual and legal issues and holdings of the court are certainly matters of legitimate public concern, the identity of a
trial participant is not. Revealing the identities of those involved does nothing to further the public's understanding of
the issues or outcome of a court proceeding. Furthermore,
widespread publication of jurors' identities may pose a real
threat to their safety; if a victim's family or friends, or vindictive members of the public, were dissatisfied with a particularly controversial verdict, seeking retribution against a named
juror would be easier than against an unknown one.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn,84 a right of privacy action, raises some questions regarding limitations on dissemination of information about trial participants, particularly their identities. In Cox, the Court held
(1961); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses and PersonalHistories,
51 TEX. L. REV. 637 (1973).

80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976). See Galella v. Onassis, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953). See
generally Exer, Intrusion on Solitude, 21 LAw in TRANSITION 63 (1961); Comment, The
Emerging Tort of Intrusion, 55 IowA L. REV. 718 (1970).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976). See Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). See
generally Franklin, A ConstitutionalProblem in Privacy Protection, 16 STAN. L. REV.
107 (1963).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976). See Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Lord Byron v.
Johnston, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976).

84. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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that it was permissible for the media to publish a rape victim's
name, which was obtained from judicial records made open to
public inspection."a Although this decision placed the media's
first amendment rights above the victim's right of privacy, the
decision can be distinguished from issues concerning a juror's
privacy rights. In Cox, the victim's name was "publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of a crime,"86 and
the media obtained the victim's name from the indictments in
the case, which had been available for public inspection."
Thus, Cox stands for the narrow proposition that information
which is previously made availableto the public by the judicial
system may be published by the media.8 8 The Cox Court declined to decide "whether the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the
press."8 9 This is precisely the question at hand.
The three other types of tort-protected privacy are not applicable to publication of a trial participant's identity. The offense
of appropriation of name or likeness applies only to one who
appropriates for his or her own use the name or likeness of
another." The mere publicizing of a trial participant's identity,
without more, would not constitute an appropriation of the
"value" of that participant's identity.9
The offense of intrusion upon seclusion applies to one who
intentionally intrudes upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his or her private affairs, provided such intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.9 2 Although it
can be argued that the media "intrudes" upon the private affairs of trial participants when it publicizes their identities,
trial participants, situated in a courtroom, are not in seclusion;
therefore this protection is not available.9 3
85. Id. at 495.
86. Id. at 471.
87. Id. at 472.
88. Id. at 495.
89. Id. at 491.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1976).
91. Perhaps a "docudrama" about a particularly sensational trial and the jurors
involved in it could give rise to a claim of misappropriation of the value of a juror's
identity, if the juror did not consent to his inclusion in the story. This aspect of the
right of privacy, often called the right of publicity, raises first amendment issues. See
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 652S (1976).
93. Courts have held that there is no liability if the plaintiff is in a public place, not
in seclusion. See Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953) (out-
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The offense of placing the plaintiff in a false light applies to
one who publicizes an individual and thereby mischaracterizes
that individual in a manner found to be highly objectionable to
a reasonable person. 94 In order to recover damages, the plaintiff must prove the defendant knew of the falsity of the matters
reported or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.9 5 It is
highly unlikely that merely publicizing the identity of a trial
participant, without more, would constitute placing that participant in a false light.9 6
Although public disclosure of a private fact is arguably the
only tort law protection available to trial participants who seek
to avoid unwanted publicity, there may be an obstacle to its
use. This protection has been held to be inapplicable to one
who is a public figure. 97 A public figure--one who intentionally
seeks publicity or places himself or herself in the public
eye 9 8-has been found to have no right to complain about publicity which reasonably relates to public activity. 9 Thus, if a
trial participant is deemed to be a public figure, no protection
against publicity can be afforded. However, is a juror-an individual involved in the "public" event of a courtroom proceeding-necessarily a public figure?
In applying the definition "public figure" to a juror, the requirement that the juror intentionally seek publicity or put
himself or herself in the public eye is not met. One does not
intentionally become a juror; in fact, jury duty is not voluntary
but is required by law.10 0
In response, one might argue that a juror is a "nonvoluntary"
public figure, one who is placed in the public eye without intendoor market); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948)
(courtroom).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
95. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
96. However, a detailed news or feature story concerning a trial participant might
place him or her in a false light and thereby allow that participant the protection of this
type of privacy right.
97. A public figure defense is available to a defendant unless he or she intentionally publicized the falsehood. See Cox v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 493-95.
98. W. PROSSER, supra note 69, § 117, at 810-11. See also Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc.
479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, affd 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947).
99. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 493-95.
100. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq. These sections provide qualifications for federal
jurors, including United States citizenship. For a similar state statute, see CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE §§ 191-197.1 (West 1982).
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tionally seeking publicity. 1 1 If a juror is so labeled, he or she
would not be protected from public disclosure of his or her
identity because of his or her "public" albeit "nonvoluntary"
status.
However, the concept of a "nonvoluntary" public figure is
problematic and somewhat paradoxical. First, the definition of
public figure is itself contingent upon the public figure having
achieved his or her public status voluntarily; characterizing
someone as a "nonvoluntary" public figure would appear to be
a contradiction in terms. Second, if a juror is a nonvoluntary
public figure, he or she has been so labeled for the limited purpose of requiring that juror to participate in a trial and to be
observed by other trial participants and in-house courtroom
spectators.0 2 There is substantial authority for the proposition
that trial publicity reaching out-of-courtroom viewers would
exceed the scope of any "nonvoluntary public figure" status.0 3

V
Balancing a Juror's Right of Privacy with

Media Rights
A juror's right of privacy may be viewed as stemming from
either the Constitution or tort law. The press has a constitutional right to report and disseminate information; its access
rights to court proceedings are based in the first amendment
and possibly, to a limited extent, are derived from the public's
right to attend such proceedings, which in turn is derived from
the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial. This
right of access is not absolute.
When potential infringement of the first amendment is in101. It is frequently held that one who unwillingly attracts public attention, through
association with a crime or other event of interest, becomes a nonvoluntary public figure for a limited period. See Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191,
238 P.2d 670 (1951) (war hero); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957
(D. Minn. 1948) (plaintiff in divorce trial); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1946) (defendant in sedition trial); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972
(1929) (plaintiffs husband murdered). This concept has yet to be applied to a juror.
102. This concept is similar to that of the "limited purpose public figure" in defamation law. In Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court stated that "[miore commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Id. at
351.
103. See Neiman, Television in the Courtroom: Chandler v. Florida,4 CRIM. JUST. J.
439 (1981); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 1979); see supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
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volved, many courts will weigh and balance the competing interests. °4 The instant inquiry concerns a balancing of the
privacy interests of jurors against the courtroom access rights
of the media. A constitutionally recognized right of privacy
should be given greater weight than one based in tort law. Regardless of the basis of the right, however, numerous factors
should weigh favorably on the side of the jury.
The public policy arguments for protection of a juror's privacy rights are many. To begin with, one of the original theories behind the concept of a jury is the "black box." The basic
premise of this theory is that a jury should be a group of anonymous people that deliberates privately in making its decision.10 5 Guaranteeing the privacy rights of jurors is necessary
if the integrity of the jury system is to be protected.
Citizens are required by law to participate on a jury when
called. There is no requirement, however, that jurors reveal
their identities. Public revelation of a juror's identity does
nothing to further the purpose of "open" trials; it does nothing
to assure that justice is served.
The possible adverse effects of wide-spread trial publicity
can range from pressure tactics, such as letters or phone calls
to a juror in an attempt to persuade his or her decision, to general recognition of the juror by members of the community or
population at large. °6 Potentially harmful effects of trial publicity, resulting from an invasion of the juror's privacy, should
be no part of a citizen's duty to serve on a jury.
Some forms of trial publicity are more intrusive than others.
Generally, these include those forms of media which reach the
largest number of viewers, or which call the greatest attention
to a juror's identity. Photographing a juror's face in connection
with an ongoing trial can identify the juror as accurately as
publishing his or her name in a newspaper. Many courts presently do not freely reveal the identities of jurors to the written
press. 10 7 Certainly, a photograph, arguably a greater intrusion
on a juror's right of privacy, should not be permitted if names
and addresses can be withheld.
104. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrrIONAL LAw 581-82 (1978).
105. S. THOMPSON & E. MERRIAM, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, CUSTODY AND
CONDUCT OF JURIES, INCLUDING GRAND JURIES 3-4 (1882).
106. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 353.
107. See, for example, United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), in
which the court stated that jurors' names and addresses may be withheld for privacy
protection reasons, especially in widely publicized cases. Id. at 1210 n.12.
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There are serious potential side-effects of permitting jurors'
privacy rights to be violated.' °8 Citizens may increasingly attempt to be excused from jury duty, 10 9 or they may take the
public view into account when making their decisions as jurors."' This would lead, in the former case, to less representative juries, and in the latter, to less impartial juries. This
result, in turn, could violate the defendant's due process rights
and right to a fair trial."'
Wide-spread trial publicity, including revelation of jurors'
identities, is not essential to preserving the defendant's right to
a fair trial." 2 There is no information in a juror's identity
which the public needs to know in order to serve its function as
an insurer of a fair system of justice. Thus, strong arguments
against widespread trial publicity should weigh heavily against
media access rights; at the very least, the potential for invading
the privacy rights of jurors should curtail the scope of media
access rights.
Provided limitations are not so restrictive as to be unconstitutional," 3 no undue burden is placed on the media in respecting juror privacy. As the court in Galella v. Onassis"4 so aptly
noted, there is no threat to a free press in requiring it to act
within the law. 5 For decades, many courts have agreed that
wide-spread trial publicity is not essential to preserving the de108. Revealing a juror's identity to the public may adversely affect or even endanger
the juror's personal life. He or she may be harassed, threatened or actually injured
after a particularly unpopular verdict.
109. For statistics concerning the number of jurors who experience some degree of
fear if a trial is televised, see Nevas, The Casefor Camerasin the Courtroom, 20 JUDGES
J. 22 (1981).
110. See Comment, Camerasin the Courtroom: A Denialof Due Process? 30 BAYLOR
L. REV. 853, 858 (1978), in which the author states that a juror, knowing friends are
watching him, may be inclined to change his vote. Cameras may make jurors selfconscious, causing interference with the jury's function. See also Shepherd v. Florida,
341 U.S. 50, 52 (1951), in which the Supreme Court stated that pretrial publicity leads to
prejudice of the jury.
111. See generally, Hirschhorn, Cameras in the Courtroom? No, 7 BARRISTER 7
(1980); Graham & Fretz, Cameras in the Courtroom: A Dialogue, 64 A.B.A. J. 545 (1978).
112. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
113. For example, complete disclosures mandated by the trial courts in Globe,
supra note 53 and accompanying text, and Press-Enterprise,supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text, were deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
114. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
115. Id. at 996. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 104, at 581-82 and authorities cited
therein (regulation aimed at harms not caused by ideas or information as such is acceptable so long as it does not unduly constrict the free flow of information and ideas).
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fendant's fair trial right.'1 6 The Supreme Court has recognized,
in Shepherd v. Florida,"7 that a trial judge may limit the
number of spectators allowed in a courtroom." 8 Similarly, a
court should be permitted to limit the number of out-of-court
"spectators"-those who observe trials via the media-by limiting publicity of courtroom proceedings.
Although the Cox decision is frequently cited by the media
as support for permitting the publication of a trial participant's
identity, Cox is distinguishable from the instant inquiry regarding publication of a juror's identity. As noted above, Cox
stands for the proposition that information which is previously
made available to the public by the judicial system may be
published by the media." 9 The identity of a juror, however, is
not information which is necessarily made available to the
public by the judicial system. 120 Moreover, the Cox Court declined to decide "whether the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the
press.' 2 1 Thus, the Cox decision does not provide unequivocal
support for the media's position.
VI
Possible Solutions
There are two avenues which courts can pursue in an attempt to solve the problem of the invasion of a juror's privacy.
The first is to allow full media coverage of the court proceeding,
then await any possible suits brought by jurors against the media or the courts for invasion of their privacy rights. 2 2 This
solution, however, permits the damage to occur, and provides
only a remedy for injury that might have been prevented. It
does nothing to protect future jurors, the defendant or the judicial system.
116. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 535.
117. 341 U.S. at 54.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. One further distinction between
Cox and the instant issue may be the role of the trial participant-in the former case, a
victim, in the latter, a juror.
120. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
122. See Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposalfor the ConstitutionalProtectionof the News-GatheringProcess, 1980 DuKE L.J.
641, 692 n.236 (the courts have not yet recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy of a trial participant).
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The second possible solution is to allow courts to regulate
trial publicity. The most extreme method of regulation is to
require courts to completely close their doors to the media.12 3
However, no public or constitutional interest supports such an
absolute ban.' 24 Any regulation should consider the interests
being protected and reconcile all of the rights involved.
Juror privacy rights can be protected without completely excluding the media from the courtroom. An intermediate solution would be to require courts either to obtain permission
from jurors before allowing widespread publicity of their identities, or to restrict trial publicity to prevent revelation of the
jurors' identities. Either method could be easily implemented
by the trial judge.' 25 State statutes may require the trial court
to obtain permission from jurors before allowing the media to
publicize their identities. As support for this proposition,
courts have recognized that jurors' names and addresses may
be withheld for privacy reasons, especially in widely publi1 26
cized cases.
Additionally, during voir dire, a court could disclose the substance of the answers given by potential jurors while preserving their anonymity. This possibility was recently
123. Id. at 672, 691.
124. Id. See, e.g., Globe, 457 U.S. 596.
125. A trial judge may refuse to publicly release the jury list. See, e.g., United
States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1210 n.12 (5th Cir. 1977). Similarly, a trial judge should
be able to prevent the media from publicizing the physical features of a juror, whether
such publicity consists of an artist's sketch, a photograph, or a television picture. A
judge should also be able to require the consent of a juror before permitting that juror's identity to be publicized. A written or verbal waiver might be implemented by
the judge in this situation. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
126. In Gurney, the Fifth Circuit held that the "trial judge in this case did not abuse
his discretion in imposing the challenged restrictions on press access to documents.
The refusal to direct that the names and addresses of the jurors be publicly released
was well within the bounds of such discretion." 558 F.2d at 1210. The Gurney court
reasoned:
During the jury selection process, the names of the persons selected and other
jurors being examined were called in open court. The district court imposed
no restriction on publication of the names called in open court. But the judge
was following a well-established practice when he refused to publicly release
the jury list, which included the names, addresses, and other personal information about the jurors. Such protection of the privacy of the jurors was
clearly permissible, and certainly appropriate in a trial which attracted public
attention as this one did.
Id. at n.12. See, for example, In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla. 370 So. 2d
764 (Fla. 1979), in which the court noted that in certain instances a judge has discretion
on a case-by-case basis to prohibit electronic media coverage of particular participants
in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 778-79.
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acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise.127
As noted above, several states already require the consent of
jurors regarding trial publicity. 128 Many trial judges are sensitive to jurors' privacy rights and regulate trial publicity at their
discretion.'29 An effective plan for permitting trial publicity
should consider the privacy interests of jurors, without permitting such interests to be the determinative factor in deciding
whether
camera coverage or other widespread publicity takes
130
place.
VII
Conclusion
Whether to allow cameras in the courtroom has presented a
continuing problem to the courts. Most recently, the Supreme
with the use
Court held that states are allowed to experiment
13
of electronic media in their courtrooms. '
A much neglected aspect of the issue of television coverage
of courtroom proceedings, and the larger question of media access rights to such proceedings, is whether the privacy interests of jurors are violated by allowing widespread publicity of
courtroom proceedings. This note proposes that jurors do have
privacy rights, whether constitutionally based or protected by
tort law, which must be balanced against the media's right to
publicize trials.
When balancing these competing interests, privacy interests
of jurors should outweigh the media's right of broad access to
courtroom proceedings. Invasion of a juror's right of privacy is
not a necessary component of the media's right of access to
courtroom proceedings, and can be prevented without unduly
infringing on the media's exercise of its access rights.

127. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
128. These include Colorado, Louisiana, Nevada, Texas, Washington, Tennessee,
Alabama, Alaska; see Comment, supra note 10, at 137.
129. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
130. See generally Comment, supra note 10. Of course, any regulation of information about courtroom proceedings would raise issues of prior restraint. For more on
this issue, see Comment, supra note 17, at 111-15.
131. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 574-75.

